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Introduction
James Madison's essay, “Money” (pp. 2–6 as
reprinted here), considers issues that are as
timely and important today as they were when
it was first written. While his concern with an
eighteenth-century economy and his focus on
an ultimate return to a gold standard may seem
to relegate his writings to the history of eco-
nomic thought, he was in fact wrestling with
questions that have been central to monetary
theory and policymaking for more than two
centuries. Even now, his way of framing these
issues creates a wonderful opportunity for 
contrasting two fundamentally different views
of monetary policy’s role and function.
Madison, of course, wrote as a member of a
Revolutionary government that faced profound
fiscal and monetary policy problems. With no
established tax base and little ability to borrow
in the conventional “capital markets” of the
day, it confronted huge wartime expenditures
against a great power. With no alternative but
to run large deficits and monetize them, this
government accomplished the astounding feat
of financing 82 percent of its expenditures by
printing money.1
Needless to say, this achievement had 
its cost. The massive printing of money was
associated with a major inflation, which accel-
erated over time. In January 1777, $1.25 in
Continental currency could purchase $1.00 
in gold, reflecting a relatively modest depreci-
ation of 25 percent during the first year and a
half of the war. By January 1781, however,
$100 Continental was required to purchase
$1.00 in gold.
What was the source of this inflation? The
conventional answer—with which Madison
takes issue—is the quantity of money printed.
Madison (p. 6) makes a fairly standard guess
that puts the prewar money supply of the 13
colonies at $30,000,000. During the war, the
Federal government issued $226,000,000 in
Continental currency, and the states issued a
similar amount.2 Was this the “cause” of the
n 1 1 This figure, which refers to the period 1775–79, is from 
Ferguson (1961, pp. 43–44).  It contrasts markedly with the
fraction of expenditures financed through seignorage revenue 
in any modern economy.
n 2 2 See Ferguson (1961) and Nevins (1927, p. 481).
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inflation? Or was it rather that the size of the
deficit, combined with the behavior of prices,
forced that much money to be printed? And
could such a large inflation have been averted?
In analyzing Madison’s response, it is impor-
tant to note carefully how the wartime currency
was created. In 1775, the money supply of the
13 colonies consisted of paper printed by the
individual colonies plus gold and silver coin.3
Colonial governments did not redeem their
paper currencies in specie, but they did some-
times promise to do so in the future, and they
typically made taxes payable in either paper
money or specie, accepting paper at a fixed
rate in terms of specie. When the Continental
Congress began issuing its own money in 1775,
it followed the same system. Continental dollars
were not redeemable in gold or silver, but the
Congress promised postwar redemption of
paper into gold on a one-for-one basis, and it
also made paper money acceptable for taxes
on the same basis as coin.
Madison’s writings presumed that the gov-
ernment would honor its promise of a one-
for-one redemption. While that faith eventually
proved unfounded,4 one could ask a counter-
factual question: What would have happened 
if the government’s promise of redemption had
been believed and had been honored?
This question is motivated by much more
than pure intellectual curiosity. Over and over
again, governments facing large wartime
expenditures have suspended gold standards,
issued then-irredeemable paper money, and
promised to resume gold convertibility at some
date after the war’s end. Some examples of par-
ticular importance in monetary history include
Britain during and after the Napoleonic Wars
and World War I and the United States during
and after the Civil War. In each case, there was
some wartime inflation, accompanied either by
contemporary or later historical debate over
whether “better”—that is, less inflationary—
policies were available. Invariably, there was
also a postwar deflation before resumption of
a gold standard. And indeed, there were sub-
stantial deflations in many parts of the United
States after the Revolution; in some places,
these were just as pronounced as wartime
inflation. For example, by 1786 prices in Penn-
sylvania had returned to their 1773 levels
(Bezanson [1951, p. 174]).
The fact that the policies followed by the
Revolutionary government—while no doubt
necessary for it—have been so widely adopted
elsewhere suggests that Madison’s concerns are
of interest in a far broader context than just that
of the Revolutionary War. In fact, he addressed
a number of issues that remain basic in mone-
tary theory to this day, including:
i. To what extent is inflation determined 
by money growth? Is this all that matters,
as is often asserted, or does it matter
almost not at all, as Madison argued?
ii. If money growth is not all that matters,
does the degree of inflation depend 
on the nature of the government’s
promises about “backing” its money 
in the future through gold redemption 
or some other scheme?
iii. Madison’s argument about the lack of
inflation resulting from money growth 
is not based on any commitment to
reduce the money stock at some future
date. Thus, he asserts that some future
redemption in gold—essentially, a com-
mitment to future price-level stabilization
or “targeting”—is adequate to prevent
money growth from raising the price
level today. This seems in conflict with
the quantity theory of money, namely,
that inflation is always and everywhere a
monetary phenomenon.5 What is the the-
oretical foundation for Madison’s view?
iv. Wisdom that was, at least until recently,
“conventional” asserts that it is always
less inflationary to finance a deficit by
borrowing (issuing bonds) than by print-
ing money. At the end of his essay, Madi-
son denies the validity of this wisdom.
The first three of these issues relate to one 
of the oldest debates in monetary economics:
Does a permanent increase in the money sup-
ply necessarily raise the price level? Most
adherents of the quantity theory would argue
that the answer is yes, and their viewpoint 
currently prevails in the formulation of mone-
tary policy. However, a competing school of
thought argues that permanent increases in 
the money supply need not be inflationary 
n 3 3 See Smith (1988) and Rolnick, Smith, and Weber (1994) for a
discussion of this period.
n 4 4 The ultimate redemption rate was 3 cents on the dollar 
(Ferguson [1961]).
n 5 5 For discussions of the quantity theory of money, see Friedman
(1956) and Lucas (1980).  Also, while I will follow Madison in using the
term “money,” note that his arguments apply equally to any expansion in
the stock of government liabilities.  Viewed from this perspective, Madi-
son’s assertions are less obviously in conflict with the quantity theory than
they may first appear to be.
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if accompanied by appropriate “backing” of 
the newly created money. The modern intel-
lectual foundations of this idea, which has 
ancient antecedents,6 appear in Tobin (1963),
Wallace (1981), Sargent (1982), Sargent 
and Wallace (1982), and Sargent and Smith
(1987a,b). Most of the backing discussed in 
this literature assumes that increases in the
money supply are accompanied by govern-
ment asset acquisitions of equal value; hence,
this reasoning can be applied in only a limited
way even to temporary deficit monetization.
Madison argues that the government can print
money to finance temporary deficits, backed 
by a promise of future redemption (but not
retirement), and that the only resulting inflation
will be due to the delay in redemption. More-
over, he strongly denies that the behavior 
of the price level should depend in any way 
on the quantity of money printed, unless this
delays the time to redemption.7 He also asserts
that delays in future redemption put upward
pressure on the current price level.
The remainder of this article constitutes a
modern theoretical attempt to formalize and
evaluate Madison’s views. To a large extent, 
my conclusions are favorable to his line of
argument. The commitment to a future re-
demption, which is little more than a pledge 
to stabilize prices in the future, is enough to
break the link between money growth and
inflation. In addition, his assertion that delayed
redemption puts upward pressure on the price
level is also strongly supported. However, 
the analysis does not suggest that price-level
behavior is fully independent of changes in the
money stock. In this respect, Madison seems to
have gone too far.
To be fair to him, a formal theoretical analy-
sis should capture the main economic aspects
of his reasoning. I take these to be as follows:
i. Money is held primarily as an asset. If 
it constitutes a future claim to specie, its 
current value should be just the dis-
counted present value of that claim.
ii. As a corollary, if other assets earn a
higher return than money, this happens
only because they involve some “incon-
venience,” such as being issued in exces-
sively large denominations.
iii. An alternative asset to money exists. The
real rate of interest on it is unaffected by
government policy (although it need not
always be held in positive quantities).
In the subsequent section, I build a model
incorporating these features and apply it to
some of the issues that concerned Madison. In
doing so, I gloss over some other issues that 
he took up, but the concluding section offers
comments on them as well.
I. The Environment
To illustrate Madison’s points, I consider a two-
period-lived, overlapping-generations model of
a particularly simple variety.8 At each date
t = 0, 1, ..., a set of N identical agents is born.
They are endowed in both periods with some
of a single perishable consumption good; let 
wj (j = 1, 2) denote the age j endowment of a 
representative agent.  I assume throughout that
w1 > 0 and w2 > 0.
In addition, agents have access to a
reversible linear technology which allows 
one unit of current consumption to be con-
verted into f> 0 ounces of gold (and back
again, if desired).  One possible interpretation 
of the technology is that this is a small open
economy operating in a world on a gold stan-
dard, so that the consumption good can always
be bought or sold abroad at a fixed rate for
some amount of gold.  Such an interpretation
would obviously be fairly appropriate to the
economy in which Madison lived.
Once obtained, gold can either be stored in
raw form or—if the domestic economy is on a
gold standard—it can be coined.  In either
case, it depreciates at the rate d Î (0,1).
Each young agent values age j consumption,
denoted cj , according to the (common) utility
function ln c1 + b ln c2.  Note that gold is then
not held by agents for its consumption value; it
is held—if at all—only as an asset.
It will be necessary in what follows to allow
for the possibility that agents born at certain
dates face a government-levied tax. Any direct
taxes that the government does levy are lump-
sum in nature. I also assume that agents pay
these taxes (if at all) only when old.
The following notation will prove useful:
Suppose an agent, born at date t, pays a lump-
n 6 6 See Mints (1945) for a discussion of this idea, as well as 
for criticisms.
n 7 7 Note that one could also cast this as an increase in the stock 
of outstanding government debt without affecting the market value of 
the debt, unless it delayed the time to redemption.
n 8 8 The model closely resembles that of Sargent and Wallace (1983).
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of return on a single asset of rt + 1 between t
and t + 1. Then, let s(w1,w2 –  tt + 1,rt + 1) 
denote the savings function of this agent.
Given the assumed form of the utility function,
clearly
10
I will assume that agents are willing to save,
even if they must do so by storing gold in raw
form; I therefore impose an assumption:9
Assumption 1. s (w1,w2,1 – d ) > 0.
II.  The Government
The government that Madison contemplated 
as he wrote had large wartime spending needs
and very limited powers of taxation. The result
was a massive government budget deficit that
was financed by printing paper money.
In Madison’s vision—which essentially
eventuated in practice—the war would be 
followed by a period of peace accompanied 
by a relatively balanced government budget, 
or perhaps even one in surplus. During this
time, wartime paper money would continue 
to circulate.10 After a transitional period, the
paper money would be retired, having been
converted into gold at some specified rate.
Thereafter, the economy would remain on a
gold standard, and Madison (as well as others) 
probably envisioned a purely metallic currency
from that point onward.
In consonance with this scenario, I consider
a government confronting the following cir-
cumstances. For dates t = 0, 1, ..., T1, the gov-
ernment has a real per capita expenditure (and
deficit) level of g > 0.11 It finances expendi-
tures solely by printing paper currency that is
not then redeemable, but that it promises to
convert into gold at some future date.
During this period, the government con-
fronts the budget constraint
(2) g = (Mt – Mt – 1)/pt; t = 0, ..., T1
where Mt is the stock of paper currency out-
standing at t, and pt is the time t price level.
The initial money stock M – 1 is given as an 
initial condition. For simplicity—and consis-
tency with the realities of a Revolutionary 
government—I set M – 1 = 0.
The government has no direct expenditures
for dates t > T1. I assume that for t = T1 + 1, ...,
T – 1, it engages in no activity whatsoever, 
and neither adds to nor subtracts from the
existing stock of money. A gold standard has
not yet been established, and the money is 
not yet redeemable. Thus, for t = T1, ..., T – 1, 
Mt = MT1
holds. This corresponds to the transi-
tional period prior to establishment of a full
gold standard.
At date T, the government “calls in” the
existing stock of paper currency and replaces 
it dollar for dollar with gold coins which it
mints—at its own expense—at that date.
Thereafter, it stands ready to coin freely any
gold brought to the mint by private agents. 
The government coins gold dollars and estab-
lishes a mint ratio b stating the number of
ounces of gold in a newly minted gold dollar.
Any subsequent change in the money supply is
purely the result of minting and melting activity
by the private sector. There are no policy-
induced changes in the money supply, nor is
there any further government expenditure. I
also assume that there is no uncertainty or lack
of commitment, so that the transitional dates 
T1 and T are known in advance by everyone.
At T, the government must mint enough
new coins to redeem the existing money stock
and must raise some resources for this purpose.
Let n g
T be the number of new gold coins, in 
dollars, created by the government at T. 
Clearly n g
T = MT1
must hold. Moreover, 
to mint n g
T new gold dollars, the government
requires n g
T (b/f) units of the consumption
good, which it obtains by levying a lump-
sum tax on old agents at T. Since there is 
no other taxation at any date, under the 
policy described,
(3) tT = n g
T (b/f) = MT 1(b/f)
tt = 0; t ¹ T.
After date T – 1, the entire stock of money
consists of gold dollars.  I assume that gold
(1) s (w1, w2 – tt +1,rt +1) = 1 + b  – (1 + b)rt +1
. bw1 w2 – tt +1
n 9 9 Assumption 1 is equivalent to bw1(1 - d ) > w2.
n 1 10 0 Of course, this did not happen after the Revolution, as the
phrase "not worth a Continental" indicates.  However, a good deal of new
paper money was created, by both state and federal governments, from
1783 to 1789.  For an overview of this period, see Rolnick, Smith, and
Weber (1994).
n 1 11 1 As noted above, the Revolutionary government financed about
82 percent of its expenditures by printing money.  Thus, the implied
abstraction from tax revenue is well founded.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1998 Q111
coins circulate by weight,12 and I let Gt denote
the stock of gold dollars—by weight—at t.  
As before, pt continues to denote the time t
price level.
III.  The Behavior of Agents
In this section, I describe the behavior of agents
before, during, and after the implementation of
a gold standard.
The Paper Money Regime (t < T – 1)
For all t < T, paper currency is in circulation
(although the promise of ultimate redemption
is understood and believed). I also focus on the
situation where paper money is accepted vol-
untarily in exchange for private assets.13 Since
agents can choose between holding money and
holding raw gold as an asset,14 clearly money
will be held only if it earns a real return as
great as that on raw gold.15 The gross real
return on paper currency between t and t + 1 
is given by pt /pt + 1, and the gross real return
on storage of raw gold is 1 – d.  Thus,
(4) pt /pt + 1 ³ 1 – d; t = 0, ..., T – 1
must hold.
Let gt denote the storage of raw gold by a
young agent at t, and let mt denote the accu-
mulation of real balances. Then gt, mt, and a
consumption profile (c1t,c2t) are chosen to
maximize ln c1t + b ln c2t , subject to
(5) c1t + mt + (gt /f) £ w1
and
(6) c2t £ w2 + mt(pt /pt + 1)
+ (1 – d )(gt /f).
The solution to this problem sets
(7) mt + gt = s(w1,w2,pt /pt + 1)
and
(8) [(pt /pt + 1) – (1 – d)]gt = 0.
Equation (8) asserts that, if the return on
money exceeds that on the storage of raw gold,
no raw gold will be stored.
The Transition (t = T – 1)
Young agents born at T – 1 will live through the
transition to a gold standard; when old, they
will bear the costs of this transition. They thus
bear the lump-sum tax, t T ,when old.
In addition, when old, these agents will have
the opportunity to coin or melt gold.  Let nt
j be
the coinage (or melting, if negative) of gold by
a representative agent of age j (j = 1,2) in
period t.  Clearly this coinage can be nonzero
only for t ³ T.  Young agents born at T - 1
choose a level of real balances, mT – 1, a quan-
tity of raw gold storage, gT - 1, a consumption
profile (c1T – 1,c2T – 1), and a minting/melting
strategy when old n2
T , to maximize ln c1T – 1
+ b ln c2T – 1, subject to
(9) c1T – 1 + mT – 1 + (gT – 1/f) £ w1
and
(10) c2T – 1 £ w2 – tT + mT – 1(pT – 1/pT)
+ (1 – d)(gT – 1/f) + n2
T [(1/pT) – (b/f)],
where the last term in (10) represents the profit
from using (b/f) units of resources to obtain 
n2
T gold dollars, which then have a purchasing
power of n2
T /pT.
An absence of arbitrage opportunities
requires that
(11) pT = f/b.
When (11) holds, as it must in equilibrium, 
the total savings of a young agent at T – 1 
must satisfy
(12) mT – 1 + gT – 1 = s(w1,w2,pT – 1/pT).
In addition, gT – 1 = 0 holds if pT – 1/pT > 1 – d.
n 1 12 2 I could assume equally well that coins circulate according to
their face value (“by tale”). Each outcome is an equilibrium, and it makes
no qualitative difference to the results which situation obtains. For a dis-
cussion of coins that circulate by tale, see Sargent and Smith (1997).
n 1 13 3 In practice, during the Revolution, the army often seized what it
needed, offering a choice of paper liabilities or nothing in exchange.
Clearly here, when paper money was taken, it was not taken voluntarily.
Madison obviously conceived of a situation where agents take money for
goods of their own volition.
n 1 14 4 And since there is no uncertainty.
n 1 15 5 Parenthetically, Madison's argument implies that he regarded
money as an asset, earning a return competitive with that on relatively
close substitutes.
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Since the nominal gold stock (in ounces) is
constant, private minting/melting in each




2)/2 = dGt – 1; t ³ T + 1.
In periods before the advent of the gold
standard, there is a much richer variety of pos-
sible equilibrium outcomes.16 Here I construct
an equilibrium having certain features and then
display the restrictions on parameters required
for those features to emerge.  The equilibrium
features I consider are chosen for two reasons.
First, they seem illustrative of what Madison
had in mind.  Second, for much of history,
economies have abandoned gold standards in
time of war and financed their deficits by print-
ing paper money.  With the cessation of hostili-
ties, the government budget is roughly bal-
anced (or even in surplus), although gold
convertibility is not immediately resumed.  A
postwar deflation occurs during this period, ter-
minating with the resumption of gold convert-
ibility.  Indeed, such a pattern was observed
through much of the United States following
both the Revolutionary War and the Civil War,
and in the United Kingdom after World War I.
For these reasons, I focus on equilibria which
display inflation for t = 0, 1, ..., T1, followed by
a deflation for t = T1 + 1, ..., T.  This deflation
ends with conversion to a gold standard.
The Deflation (t = T1 + 1, ..., T )
In this section, I state conditions under which
there is an equilibrium satisfying
(19) pt ³ pt + 1; t  = T1, ..., T – 1.
Note that (19) implies that no agent will wish to
store raw gold during the period in question.
At date T – 1, young agents understand that
they will be required to pay for the transition to
a gold standard.  In addition, since they store
no gold when young, the time T – 1 equilib-
rium condition in the money market is that
(20) MT – 1/pT – 1 = MT1
/pT – 1
= s (w1,w2 – tT,pT – 1/pT) = bw1/(1 + b)
– (w2 – tT)/(1 + b)(pT – 1/pT ).
A Gold Standard (t ³ ³ T)
For t ³ T, the economy is on a gold standard.
No further taxes are levied, and all agents, old
and young, have the opportunity to mint and
melt coins at all dates.  As before, agents can
select a level of real balances, mt (now held in
the form of gold coins), a quantity of raw gold
to store, gt , a consumption profile, (c1t,c2t),
and a minting/melting strategy, (nt
2,nt
2), to
maximize ln c1t + b ln c2t, subject to
(13) c1t + mt + (gt /f) £ w1
+ n1
t [(1/pt) – (b/f)]
and 
(14) c2t £ w2 + mt(1 – d )(pt /pt + 1)
+ (gt /f)(1 –d ) + n 2
t + 1[(1//pt + 1)
– (b/f)].
The real balance term in (14) must now be
multiplied by 1 – d, since gold coins circulate
by weight and depreciate at the rate d.
As before, an absence of arbitrage opportu-
nities associated with minting and melting
requires that
(15) pt = f/b; t ³ T.
In addition, the price stability revealed in (15)
implies that there is never any reason for agents
to store raw gold rather than hold gold coins.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can take
gt = 0; t ³ T. Then, agents save entirely in the
form of gold, which earns a gross real return of
(1 – d )(pt /pt + 1) = (1 – d ), where the equality
follows from (15). Real balances per capita are
then given by
(16) mt = s (w1,w2,1 – d ); t £ T.
IV.  A General Equilibrium
For t ³ T, it is clear what must happen in 
equilibrium.  Equation (15) gives the price
level.  The nominal per capita gold stock at t,
Gt, must then obey
(17) Gt = pts (w1,w2,1 – d )
= (f/b)s (w1,w2,1 – d ); t ³ T.
n 1 16 6 This is not to say that any given economy has multiple possi-
ble equilibrium outcomes.  Rather, different economies may have equilib-
ria that look quite different from one another.
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Substituting (3) and (11) into (20), and solving
for MT1
/pT – 1 yields the equilibrium level of real
balances at T – 1:
(21) MT1
/pT – 1 = w1 – w2(f/b)/bpT – 1.
Equation (21) implies that the time T – 1 price
level is given by
(22) pT – 1 = (MT1
/w1) + (f/b)(w2/bw1).
Notice that pT – 1 ³ pT = (f/b) holds iff
(23) MT1




is satisfied. Below I derive restrictions on para-
meters implying that (23) holds.
For t = T1 + 1, ..., T – 2, young agents will
experience no regime transitions and will bear
no taxation. In addition, (19) implies that they
will store no gold. Hence the equilibrium level
of real balances at these dates is given by
(24) Mt /pt = MT1
/pt = s (w1,w2,pt /pt + 1)
= bw1/(1 + b) – w2
¸ (1 + b)(pt /pt + 1).
Equation (24) can be solved for pt in terms of
pt + 1; the implied solution is
(25) pt = MT1
[(1 + b)/bw1] + (w2/bw1)pt + 1;
t = T1 + 1, ..., T – 2.
Equations (22) and (25) describe the evolution
of the price level during the transitional period
prior to the establishment of a gold standard.
Equation (25) implies that pt ³ pt + 1 is sat-
isfied iff
(26) MT1
/pt + 1 ³ bw1/(1 + b) – w2/(1 + b)
= s (w1,w2,1)
holds.  Thus, by induction, if
(27) MT1
/pT1 + 1 ³ s (w1,w2,1)
obtains, so does equation (19).  Thus, (27) is
sufficient for a sustained postwar deflation to
be observed.
The following proposition fully describes the
behavior of the price level during this deflation,
given the inherited money supply MT1
:
PROPOSITION 1. For t = T 1 + 1, ..., T – 1, the
price level satisfies
(28) pt = (f/b)(w2/bw1)T – t
+ MT1
{w1
–1(w2/bw1)T – (t + 1)
+ [(1+b)/bw1][1 – (w2/bw1)T – (t + 1)] 
¸ [1 – (w2/bw1)]}.
Proposition 1 is easily verified by a comparison 
of equations (22), (25), and (28).
The Inflation (t £ £ T1)
It remains to describe the evolution of the
money supply and the price level during 
the wartime period of positive government
expenditure, which was obviously the issue
that concerned Madison.  In addition, he
believed that there was an alternative asset 
to money that was relevant during this period,
that money and this other asset were closely
substitutable, and that government policy 
could not influence the rate of return on the
alternative asset.  Motivated by Madison’s think-
ing, I proceed as follows in this section:  If
agents store raw gold, then gold competes 
with money in agents’ portfolios.  Moreover,
the return on gold, 1 – d, is exogenously given.
Thus, if agents store gold at any date t £ T1, this
serves the role of Madison’s alternative asset.
Of course, gold and paper money can both
be held voluntarily at t iff
(29) pt /pt + 1 = 1 – d.
I now construct an equilibrium where (29)
holds for all t = 0, 1, ..., T1 – 1.  In addition, 
raw gold is (at least potentially) stored at these
dates.  I also impose
(30) pT1
> (1 – d )pT1+ 1.
Equation (30) is consistent with inflation occur-
ring between T1 and T1 + 1, but raw gold is not
stored between these periods.  Allowing (29) to
be violated at t = T1 eases the construction of
the desired equilibrium.
Equation (29) implies that
(31) pt = (1 – d )T1–tp T1
; t = 0, ..., T1
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In addition, the government budget con-
straint (2) requires the money supply to 
evolve according to
(32) Mt = Mt – 1 + gpt
= Mt–1+ gp T1
(1 – d )T1– t; t £ T1,
with M–1 = 0 given as an initial condition.  The
following proposition then describes the evolu-
tion of the real and nominal money supplies:
PROPOSITION 2.
a) For t = 0, 1, ..., T1, the nominal money 
supply satisfies
(33.a) Mt =  M0 + (g/d )(1 – d )T1– t
´ [1 – (1 – d )t ]pT1
with
(33.b) M0 = gp0 = g(1 – d )T1pT1
.
b) For t = 0, 1, ..., T1, the real money supply
satisfies
(34) Mt /pt = (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )t + 1].
Part a of the proposition can be verified directly
by substituting (33.a) into (32). Part b is imme-
diate from (31) and (33.b).
Of course, the construction of equilibrium
just undertaken is predicated on gold being
stored at all dates prior to T1 and on (30).  Raw
gold is stored for t £ T1 – 1 if
(35) Mt /pt = (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )t + 1]
< s (w1,w2,1 – d )
is satisfied for all such dates.  Clearly this condi-
tion is equivalent to
(35¢) MT1– 1/pT1– 1 = (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )T1] 
< s (w1,w2,1 – d ).
Also, in order for (30) to hold,
(36) MT1
/pT1
= (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1] 
> s (w1,w2,1 – d )
must obtain.
It remains to determine the price level and
money stock at time T1.  Since there is no raw






= bw1/(1 + b)
– w2 /(1 + b)(pT1
/pT1+ 1).






It is then immediate from (38), (25), and 
proposition 1 that
(39) pT1
= (f/b)(w2/bw1)T – T1
+ MT1
{w1
–1(w2/bw1)T – (T1 + 1)
+ [(1+b)/bw1]
´ [1 – (w2/bw1)T – (T1 + 1)]
¸ [1 – (w2/bw1)].
Equation (36) can be rewritten as
(40) MT1
= (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1]pT1
.
Equations (39) and (40) then determine MT1 and pT1
. Once those values have been
obtained, all other equilibrium price levels can
be deduced from (28) and (31).
It will now be useful to introduce some
notation.  Define x by the relation
(41) s (w1,w2,x) º (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1].
A comparison of (36), (37), and (41) will indi-
cate that x = pT1
/pT1+ 1, and x is clearly an
exogenous variable.  Condition (30) requires
that x > 1 – d hold.  In addition, define y1
and y2 by
(42) y1 º s (w1,w2,x)(w2/bw1)T – T1
and
(43) y2 º (b/w2)y1{1 + [(1 + b)/b] 
´ [(bw1/w2)T – (T1 + 1) – 1]
¸ [1 – (w2/bw1)]}.
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The following result is then immediate:
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that
(44) y1 ³ (1 – y2)(1 + b)s (w1,w2,1)/b > 0
and
(45) g(1 – d )T1 – 1 ³ w2[x – (1 – d )]/(1 + b)x
> dbw1/(1 + b).
Then, an equilibrium satisfying (19), (29), and
(30) exists.  This equilibrium has
(46) MT1
= (f/b)y1/(1 – y2)
and
(47) pT1
= (f/b)(w2/bw1)T – T1/(1 – y2).
The proof of proposition 3 appears in 
appendix A.  The first inequality in (44)
implies that (23) is satisfied and hence 
that pT – 1 ³ pT holds.  The second in-
equality in (44) is required for MT1
> 0 
and pT1 > 0 to hold.  Finally, (45) implies 
that (35), (36), x > 1 – d , and (27) are satis-
fied.  Satisfaction of (27), of course, implies that
pt ³ pt + 1 holds for all t = T1 + 1, ..., T – 1.
It remains to describe conditions under
which the inequalities in (45) are satisfied.
These conditions are stated in the following: 
PROPOSITION 4.
a) The relations in (44) hold iff
(48) [(w1 + w2)/w1](w2/bw1)T – (T1 + 1)
> w2(x – 1)/xs(w1,w2,x)
³ (w2/bw1)T– (T1 + 1)
is satisfied.
b) Suppose that w1, w2, b, T1 and T satisfy
bw1 > w2, T ³ T1 + 2, and
(49) 1/(1 + T1) > w2/bw1.
Then, there exists a nonempty interval, [x –,x –),
with x – > 1, such that (48) holds iff x Î [x –,x –).
In addition, for all x Î [x –,x –), (1.a.) and (45)
hold if d is sufficiently close to zero.
Proposition 4, which is proved in appendix B,
asserts that parameter values can always be
chosen so that the construction of equilibrium
performed here is valid.  In the next section, I
examine some properties of this equilibrium.
V. Madison's Assertions
It is now possible to use the construction of
sections III and IV to investigate the validity of
some of Madison’s main assertions, which I
take to be as follows:
i. For a government following the kind of
policy outlined in section II, the simple
quantity theory of money fails, even
before the transition to a gold standard.
That is, the rate of inflation and the
growth rate of the money stock are not
the same, and it is easy for the money
growth rate to substantially exceed the
inflation rate.
i )More strongly, the behavior of the price
level is independent of the quantity of
money printed, so long as there is no
uncertainty about the date of transition to
a gold standard.
(i )While this may reflect my own reading,
Madison seems to suggest that the behav-
ior of the price level does not depend 
on the size of the government deficit, so
long as there is no uncertainty about T. 
Anything that delays the transition to a
gold standard acts to raise prices, at least
up to date T1.
I now investigate each of these propositions.
It is the case here that the rate of growth of
the money stock does exceed the rate of infla-
tion in all periods prior to T. Indeed, in some
periods the difference can be quite substantial.
I now state the following result:
PROPOSITION 5. For all t < T, it is true that 
Mt + 1/Mt > pt + 1/pt holds.
Indeed,
a) for t £ T1 – 1,
(50) pt + 1/pt = (Mt + 1/Mt)[1 – (1 – d )t + 1]
¸ [1 – (1 – d )t + 2] < (Mt + 1/Mt).





Economic Review 1998 Q1to a gold standard.  Let T ~(T)
denote the transition date in
the first (second) economy,
and let  p ~
t(pt) be the date t
price level in the first 
(second) economy.  Suppose
that T ~ > T and x ³ x – hold.
Then, p ~
t > pt for all t £ T1.
Thus, other things equal, a more rapid
movement to a gold standard implies less
upward pressure on the price level, exactly 
as Madison argued.  It is also easy to show 
that it implies less money will be printed.
VI.  Conclusion
Madison’s essay, “Money,” challenges the belief
in a necessary connection between money
growth and inflation that underlies much of the
quantity theory of money.  He obviously con-
sidered the circumstances of a government that
was engaged in monetizing a temporary budget
deficit, issuing inconvertible paper money, and
promising to establish a gold standard and
redeem its paper currency at some future time.
If honored, as this (and Madison’s) analysis
assumes, such a promise would constitute a
type of future “backing” of money issues that
he thought would limit inflation and break the
connection between inflation and the rate of
money growth.  Moreover, his concerns have
universal application; many other governments
at other times have confronted similar circum-
stances and conducted similar policies.
The model constructed here can—under 
circumstances that have been described—
give rise to equilibria that mimic general obser-
vations about what occurs when governments
follow these kinds of policies.  There is infla-
tion during wars, but deflation begins when 
the government’s wartime spending ceases.
This deflation permits resumption to begin 
as scheduled, even if the government does
nothing to contract the money supply.  The 
latter point is of some interest:  Friedman and
Schwartz (1963), for example, argue that it 
was a purely “accidental” consequence of the
postwar deflation that the United States was
able to resume gold convertibility after the 
Civil War and that very little active policy was
conducted to restore it.  The analysis here,
however, suggests that resumption of convert-
ibility was no accident.
16
(51) pt + 1/pt £ (1/x)(Mt + 1/Mt)
< Mt + 1/Mt.
The proof of proposition 5 appears in appendix
C.  For small values of d, [1 – (1 – d )t + 1]
¸ [1 – (1 – d )t + 2] is approximately equal to 
(t + 1)/(t + 2).  Thus, early in the period of
deficit finance, the price level can rise far 
more slowly than the money supply.  In 
addition, since the money supply is constant
for t = T1, ..., T – 1, and since deflation 
is under way during this time, the money 
supply grows faster than the price level 
here as well.  Indeed, since x can be fairly
large, equation (51) implies that the difference
between the rate of inflation and the rate 
of money creation can again be quite great.
Thus, Madison’s first assertion is borne out.
As is apparent from proposition 1 and 
equation (31), however, the model supports
Madison’s second assertion less well.  The 
price level at all dates can be viewed as
depending—and, moreover, depending 
proportionally—on MT1.  Since M–1 = 0, 
MT1 is the total quantity of paper money 
printed during the period of deficit finance.
The entire time path of prices, up to date 
T, depends on MT1, although the rate of 
inflation does not.
Similarly, the analysis suggests that the 
total size of the deficit financed through date 
T1 affects the price level at all dates and the rate
of inflation/deflation at all dates t = T1, ..., T – 1.
However, it does not affect the rate of inflation
for t < T, which is simply 1/(1 – d).  To see the
first point, notice from equations (41), (42), and
(43) that a higher government budget deficit
raises y2 and hence—by equation (47)—
raises pT1
.  From equation (41), an increase 
in g also raises x; this clearly raises pT1
/pT1+ 1;
indeed, it raises pt /pt + 1 for all t = T1, ...,
T – 1.  Thus, a larger deficit raises the price
level for all dates up to and including T1; 
but a larger deflation also ensues when deficit
spending ceases.
It remains to investigate Madison's last asser-
tion, namely, that a delay in the transition to 
a gold standard implies a higher price level 
for all t £ T1. This is, in fact, accurate, as the
next proposition asserts.  Its proof is given 
in appendix D.
PROPOSITION 6. Consider two economies that
are identical in all respects
except their dates of transition 
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I have argued that Madison's views have
much theoretical validity.  Indeed, the kind 
of policy he describes allows the inflation rate
to be very different from the rate of money
growth, and the time to redemption has poten-
tially great importance in determining the
behavior of the price level.  However, the 
link between the behavior of the money 
supply and the behavior of the price level 
is not completely broken, as he asserts it
should be.
But why isn’t this link broken?  Tobin 
(1963), Wallace (1981), and Sargent and Smith
(1987a,b) describe circumstances under which
appropriately conducted increases in the
money supply—that is, increases which are
appropriately “backed”—have no price level
consequences.  Madison’s policy backs current
money creation with a promise of future gold
redemption; here, this promise requires that the
government run future surpluses to raise the
resources required for redemption.  Why don’t
these resources constitute the backing required
by Tobin, Wallace, and Sargent and Smith?  The
answer is that Madison's scheme assigns the
redemption cost to a specific generation; that is,
it redistributes resources among generations.
This prevents the kind of policy he discusses
from being irrelevant to price-level behavior.
Madison’s analysis nonetheless raises a host
of fascinating issues which remain unaddressed
here.  For example, is there an “optimal” speed
of transition to a gold standard?  Mitchell (1897)
maintained that the United States took too 
long to resume gold convertibility after the 
Civil War; Keynes argued that Britain resumed
too quickly after World War I, causing an exces-
sively large postwar deflation.  An analysis of
the “correct” length of time to redemption
would definitely be interesting in light of these
discussions.
Madison also challenged the common notion
that borrowing to finance a deficit is less infla-
tionary than monetizing the same deficit.  His
particular concern was that the implied interest
payments on the government debt simply add
to the government’s financial burden, exacer-
bating inflation.  The same concern is reflec-
ted in Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) work 
on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” which
describes conditions under which Madison’s
reservations are well founded. Indeed, the 
Sargent–Wallace conditions can be weak-
ened substantially, as shown by Bhattacharya, 
Guzman, and Smith (1995).
However, Madison’s analysis of money 
versus bond financing of a government 
budget deficit raises an even subtler issue.  
His final paragraph discusses government
bonds that bear interest only because their
large denominations make them costly to use 
in many transactions.  Adding this feature to 
the others implicit in his description would
yield a model similar to that of Bryant and 
Wallace (1979), in which bond finance is
always more inflationary than money finance
because it increases the costs of trade.  How-
ever, Bryant and Wallace did not consider a
government confronting some of the other 
conditions that concerned Madison.  An inte-
gration of these considerations would also be
extremely interesting.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3. Equations (46) and (47)
are immediate from the equilibrium conditions
(39) and (40), and from the definitions of y1
and y2.  It then remains to verify that the solu-
tion sequence {pt} implied by (46), (47), (38),
(31), and (28) satisfies the maintained hypothe-
ses of the construction.  These hypotheses are
that equations (19), (29), and (30) are satisfied,
as are (35) and (36).  Equation (29) is clearly
satisfied by construction for t £ T1 – 1.
The first equality in (44) implies that 
(23) is satisfied; as noted in the text, satisfac-
tion of (23) is equivalent to pT – 1 ³ pT .
pT1
> (1 – d )pT1+ 1 is equivalent to x >
1 – d .  Iff (27) is satisfied, pt  ³ pt + 1
holds for t = T1 + 1, ..., T – 1.  In view 
of (30), a sufficient condition for (27) is that
(A.1) (1 – d )MT1
/pT1
= (1 – d )(g/d )
´ [1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1]
= (1 – d )s (w1,w2,x)
³ s (w1,w2,1)
be satisfied.  (A.1) is easily shown to be equiva-
lent to the second inequality in (45).  This
inequality also implies that x > 1 – d .  Thus,
the first inequality in (44) and the second
inequality in (45) imply that (19) and (30) are
satisfied.
As already noted, (36) holds iff x > 1 – d ,
which is implied by the second inequality in
(44).  Moreover, by the definition of x, (35¢) is
equivalent to
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(A.2) (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1 – 1 + (1 – d )T1]
= g(1 – d )T1 ³ s (w1,w2,x)
– s (w1,w2,1 – d )
= w2[x – (1 – d )] /(1 + b)(1 – d )x.
But this is obviously the first inequality in (45),
establishing the proposition.  n
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 4. The second inequality
in (44) obviously holds iff y2 < 1. It is easy 
to verify that
(A.3) y2 º [s (w1,w2,x)/s (w1,w2,1)] 
´ {1 – (w2/bw1)T – (T1 + 1)
´ [1 – s (w1,w2,1) /w1]}.
Then, y2 < 1 holds iff
(A.4) [s (w1,w2,x) – s (w1,w2,1)]
¸ s(w1,w2,x) < [1 – s (w1,w2,1)/w1]
´ (w2/bw1)T – (T1 + 1)
is satisfied.  Rearranging terms in (A.4) yields
the first inequality in (48).
To obtain the second inequality in (48), note
that the first inequality in (44) holds iff
(A.5) [b/(1 + b)]s (w1,w2,x)(w2/bw1)T – T1
³ s (w1,w2,1) – s(w1,w2,x)
+ s(w1,w2,x)[1 – s (w1,w2,1)/w1]
´ (w2/bw1)T – T1 – 1.
Rearranging terms in (A.5) yields the second
inequality in (48).
To establish part (b) of the proposition,
notice that
(A.6) w2(x – 1)/xs (w1,w2,x)
= (1 + b)w2(x – 1)/bw1[x – (w2/bw1)].
and
(A.7) lim
x®¥ w2(x – 1)/xs (w1,w2,x)
= (1 + b)w2/bw1
are satisfied.  Moreover, T ³ T1 + 2 implies that
lim
x®¥ w2(x – 1)/xs (w1,w2,x)
> (w2/bw1)T – (T1 + 1)
holds.  Thus, the condition
(A.8) w2(x – – 1)/x –s (w1,w2,x –)
º (w2/bw1)T – (T1 + 1)
has a solution x – > 1.  Likewise, if the 
condition
(A.9) w2(x – 1)/xs (w1,w2,x)
= [(w1 + w2)/w1](w2/bw1)T – (T1 + 1)
has a solution, let x – denote it.  If (A.9) has no
solution, let x – = ¥. Then, the inequalities in
(48) are clearly satisfied iff x Î [x –,x –).
It remains to show that d can be selected to
satisfy (a.1) and (45).  To begin, rewrite (45) as
(A.10) g(1 – d )T1 – 1 º d (1 – d )T1 – 1 
´ s (w1,w2,x)/[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1]
³ w2[x – (1 – d )]/(1 + b)x
> dbw1/(1 + b).
Clearly, bw1 > w2 implies that, for d near
zero, (a.1) and the second inequality in (A.10)
are satisfied.  Moreover, the first inequality in
(A.10) can be written in the form
(A.11) d (1 – d )T1 – 1/[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1]
³ (w2/bw1)[x– (1 – d )]
¸ [x – (w2/bw1)].
For d satisfying assumption 1 and for all x > 1,
we clearly have
(w2/bw1)[x– (1 – d )]/[x– (w2/bw1)]
< (w2/bw1).
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Moreover, by L’Hopital’s rule,
lim
d®0 d (1 – d )T1 – 1/[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1]
= 1/(T1 + 1).
Thus, condition (49) implies that, for all 
x Î [x –,x –), both inequalities in (45) are satis-
fied whenever d is chosen sufficiently small.   n
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 5.
a)  For t £ T1 – 1, equation (50) follows imme-
diately from (34). Moreover, by L’Hopital’s rule,
lim
d®0 [1 – (1 – d )t + 1]/[1 – (1 – d )t + 2]
= (t + 1)/(t + 2).
Hence, the assertion in the text following the
proposition.
b)  Equation (34), the definition of x, and 
Mt/pt = s (w1,w2,pt /pt + 1), t  = T1, ..., T – 1,
imply that pT + 1/pT1
= x = x (MT1 + 1/MT1
),
since the money supply is constant for all 
t ³ T1. Moreover, for t  = T1 + 1, ..., T – 1, the
conditions pt + 1 £ pt  and Mt/pt = MT1
/pt
= s (w1,w2,pt /pt + 1) are satisfied.  Therefore,
Mt/pt ³ Mt/pt –1 ³ ××× ³ MT1
/pT1
=
s(w1,w2,x) must hold.  It is then immediate
that, for all such t, pt /pt + 1 > x, and pt + 1/pt
< (1/x)(Mt + 1/Mt) = 1/x obtain.   n
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 6. Define y ~
2(y2) by
(A.12) y ~
2 º (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1] 
{w1
–1(w2/bw1)T ~ – (T1 + 1)
+ [(1 + b)/bw1][1 – (w2/bw1)T ~ – (T1+1)] 
¸ [1 – (w2/bw1)]}
and
(A.13) y2 º (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1]
´ {w1
–1(w2/bw1)T – (T1 + 1)
+ [(1 + b)/bw1][1 – (w2/bw1)T– (T1 + 1)]




= (f/b)(w2/bw1)T ~– T1/(1 – y ~
2)
(A.15) pT1
= (f/b)(w2/bw1)T – T1 /(1 – y2)




(A.16) (w2/bw1)T ~– T(1 – y2) > 1 – y ~
2
is satisfied.
Now, straightforward manipulation estab-
lishes that
(A.17) (w2/bw1)T ~– Ty2 = y ~
2 – (g/d )
´ [1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1][(1 + b)/bw1]
´ [1 – (w2/bw1)T ~– T ]/[1 – (w2/bw1)].
Substituting (A.17) into (A.16) and rearranging





2 – (w2/bw1)T ~– T y2
= (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1][(1 + b)/bw1]
´ [1 – (w2/bw1)T ~– T ]/[1 – (w2/bw1)]
> 1 – (w2/bw1)T ~– T.
When T ~ > T obtains, (A.18) is equivalent to
(A.18¢) (g/d )[1 – (1 – d )T1 + 1][(1 + b)/bw1]
¸ [1 – (w2/bw1)] º s (w1,w2,x)
¸ s (w1,w2,1) > 1.
Since  x – > 1, (A.18¢) clearly holds for all
x ³ x –.   n
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